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THE FTC v. XEROX LITIGATION: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM
James McKeown*
Today, the United States patent system accurately echoes the characteriza-
tion of a patent jurist as one that is "often overlooked, misunderstood, ma-
ligned in some quarters and occasionally in distress."' As if to render this
statement unimpeachable, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint?
against Xerox Corporation on January 29, 1973, alleging violations of sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.3 A proposed consent decree
which would end the litigation has recently been submitted to the Com-
mission. 4 While the proposed decree, dealing primarily with issues of patent
* Member, District of Columbia Bar. B.E., C.C.N.Y., 1959; J.D., Catholic Uni-
versity of America, 1970; LL.M., George Washington University, 1974.
1. In re Mixon, 470 F.2d 1374, 1378 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (supplemental opinion
of Worley, C.J.).
2. Xerox Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 20,164, at 22,151
(FTC, filed Jan. 31, 1973). Wherever possible, the complaint has been cited to the ex-
cerpt found in the CCH reporting service. Where the author has relied upon portions
of the complaint which do not appear in the CCH excerpt, the official citation is given.
3. Act of September 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a) (1) (1970): "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful."
4. The consent decree, signed October 5, 1974, represents an agreement reached dur-
ing pre-hearing negotiations between Xerox and counsel for the Commission. The par-
ties to the agreement will apply to the Commission for the withdrawal of the case from
adjudication pursuant to section 2.34(d) of the Commission's rules. If the Commission
accepts the agreement, it will become part of the official record of the proceeding and
will be placed on the public record for sixty days. The Commission may withdraw its
acceptance after the sixty day period if within the subsequent thirty days comments sub-
mitted by the public disclose facts or considerations in light of which the proposed order
is inadequate. At any time prior to final acceptance of the order the Commission may
require hearings regarding the appropriateness of the proposed relief. The agreement
states that it cannot be construed as an admission by Xerox that it has acted illegally.
Consent order procedure is set out in 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31-.35 (1974).
The consent decree calls for less remedial action on the part of Xerox than the Notice
of Contemplated Relief filed with the Commission's complaint. See Xerox Corp., No.
8909 (F.T.C., filed Jan. 31, 1973). Among the provisions of the proposed consent decree
most relevant to the issues discussed in this article are:
First, Xerox must grant, upon written request, a nonexclusive license under any of
its office copier patents. In a number of cases, the license may be royalty-free; where
it is not, Xerox will be permitted to charge a royalty of %% of the revenue realized
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licensing, will, if adopted, settle the specific dispute between the Commission
and Xerox, the complaint raises serious issues for patent and antitrust law
which must, at some future date, be resolved. The complaint's allegations
provide a convenient starting point for this analysis of several existing short-
comings of the patent system.
I. THE COMPLAINT
Among other things, 5 Xerox has been charged with engaging in certain
acts, practices and methods of competition relating to patents, 6 with possess-
ing monopoly power in the sale and lease of office copiers (the relevant mar-
ket) and in the sale and lease of plain paper copiers (the relevant submar-
ket) .7 The ten broad allegations of patent misuse set forth in paragraph 14
from sale or lease of the product for each Xerox patent utilized in production, the total
charge not to exceed 1 % of such revenue. There is provision for a three-year post-
ponement of licensing under patents involved in the production of certain types of office
copier equipment. Existing licensees will be able to take advantage of the provisions
of the proposed order.
Second, for a reasonable charge, Xerox must provide a licensee with know-how, in-
cluding written clarifications. Xerox may insist that its know-how be protected as a
trade secret, and will be under no obligation to disclose after five years from the date
of the final order.
Third, licensees of Xerox can be required to grant nonexclusive licenses to Xerox un-
der their own office copier patents. Most licenses granted to Xerox will be subject to
licensing upon request of any Xerox licensee or any person eligible to become a Xerox
licensee.
Fourth, for a period of ten years following the date of the final order, Xerox will
be barred from acquiring any patents or exclusive licenses on office copier products ex-
cept in cases where it has participated in or sponsored research, and will be barred from
acquiring companies that manufacture or develop office copiers.
For a more detailed explanation of the decree, see 199 BNA PAT., T.M. AND COPY-
RIGHT J. A-4 (Oct. 17, 1974). The complete text of the decree appears in id. at D-
1.
5. The Commission charges in paragraph 13 of the complaint that Xerox has the
power to inhibit, frustrate and hinder effective competition among firms participating
in the relevant market. Xerox Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
20,164, at 22,151-52 (FTC, filed Jan. 31, 1973). In paragraph Efteen, the corpora-
tion is alleged to have acquired a 51% interest in Rank Xerox, a United Kingdom cor-
poration jointly organized by Rank Organization and Xerox Corporation for the purpose
of manufacturing and distributing office copiers throughout the world except the United
States, its territories and possessions, and Canada. In paragraph sixteen, the Commis-
sion charges that Xerox has engaged in such practices for the purposes of monopolizing
the relevant market and submarket while preserving, maintaining and furthering a highly
concentrated market structure with high barriers to entry while hindering, restraining,
foreclosing and frustrating competition in the relevant market and submarket. Id. at
22,152.
6. Id. 14.
7. Id. 26, at 22,151. Figures which demonstrate this domination were cited in
the FTC complaint, Xerox Corp., No. 8909 (F.T.C., filed Jan. 31, 1973). In 1971,
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of the complaint," as Well as the relief sought, form the subject matter of this
article. The complaint is not a model of clarity as to these allegations, since
they are couched in broad and conclusory language. 9 Nor is it possible to
Xerox's total revenues were about $2 billion, its net income after taxes was approxi-
mately $213 million and its total assets were about $2.2 billion. Id. 3. In that same
year, industry revenues from the sale and lease of office copiers were about $1.1 billion
and total revenues from the sale and lease of office copiers and supplies were approxi-
mately $1.7 billion. Id. I 9(a). Xerox accounted for more than 85% of the former
and 60% of the latter. 1971 industry revenues from the sale and lease of plain paper
copiers and supplies were about $1 billion, with Xerox accounting for approximately
95% of these revenues. Id. 19(a). Of the approximately twenty-five firms presently
engaged in the office copier market, twenty-three sell or otherwise distribute plain paper
copiers. Id. 9(b). After Xerox, the next largest firm in the office copier market
accounted for only 10% of the 1971 revenues from the sale or lease of office copiers
and the sale of supplies. id. I 9(b).
8. The ten patent misuse allegations in paragraph 14 of the complaint are:
(a) monopolizing and attempting to monopolize patents applicable to office
copiers,
(b) maintaining a patent barrier to competition by attempting to recreate
a patent structure which would be equivalent in scope to expired patents,
(c) developing and maintaining a patent structure of great size, complexity,
and with obscure boundaries,
(d) using its patent position to obtain access to technology owned by actual
or potential competitors,
(e) entering into cross-license arrangements with actual or potential competi-
tors,
(f) including in licenses under United States Patent Number 3,121,006 pro-
visions having the effect of limiting licensees to the manufacture and sale
of only coated paper copiers,
(g) offering patent licenses applicable to plain paper copiers with provisions
which, in effect, limit the licensee to the manufacture or sale of low speed
copiers,
(h) including in patent licenses provisions having the effect of precluding the
licensee from utilizing Xerox patents in the office copier market,
(i) entering into and maintaining agreements with Battelle Memorial Institute,
Inc. and Battelle Development Corporation . . . pursuant to which Bat-
telle is required to convey to Xerox all patents, patent applications, and
know-how coming into its possession relative to xerography,
(j) preventing actual and potential competitors from developing plain paper
copiers while permitting them to develop coated paper copiers.
Xerox Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 20,164, at 22,152 (FTC,
filed Jan. 31, 1973).
9. Understandably, Xerox Corporation filed a motion for a more definite statement
of the complaint in order to obtain the facts supporting the complaint's allegations.
Xerox requested the Commission to enumerate the patents which it is accused of
monopolizing and attempting to monopolize as well as the conduct alleged to amount
to such monopolization and attempted monopolization. The Commission was also asked
to explain how Xerox attempted to recreate a patent structure equivalent in scope to ex-
pired patents, to specify which patents are within the structure and which unexpired pat-
ents are involved, and, finally, to define the phrases "obscure boundaries" and
"provisions which, in effect, limit," two phrases used in subparagraphs (c) and (g) re-
spectively of paragraph 14 of the complaint. See note 8 supra.
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fathom with any degree of certainty whether each of the patent misuses
charged constitutes a separate violation of section 5, or if all the allegations,
when coupled with the other allegations' ° in the complaint, are charged as
a single, aggregate violation." From what has already taken place, however,
it does appear that at least certain of the patent misuse allegations, 2 accord-
ing to the Commission's theory, are separate section 5 violations.
It will also 'be of some interest to examine the nature of the relief sought
in the way of compulsory patent licensing, especially since the Commission,
for the first time, seeks to impose royalty-free licensing as a remedy." s
At a time when the value of the patent system has come under examina-
tion,' 4 and a variety of corrective legislation has been introduced in Con-
gress" to bring it in phase with modern conditions, the Xerox litigation has
even more serious and far-reaching overtones with respect to the nature of
the alleged patent misuses. It is important to recognize the root causes of
the various challenged practices, for only in this way can the bases for misuse
be purged and confidence in the patent system be restored in those who feel
most threatened 'by the Commission's action.' 6
II. THE CONTEMPLATED RELIEF
In the Notice of Contemplated Relief accompanying its complaint, the
10. See 13 & 15. Xerox Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
20,164, at 22,151 & 22,152 (FTC, filed Jan. 31, 1973).
11. The Federal Trade Commission has not yet made clear the direction in which
it is headed. However, it has taken the position that Xerox has monopolized the market
through many interrelated practices and that even if Xerox's market power does not
reach monopoly proportions it has still created the maintenance of a highly concentrated
market structure with high barriers to entry, see id. 16(b), at 22,152, and inhibited
and frustrated competition, see id. 16(c).
12. See id. 14(a), (b), (f) and (g), at 22,152.
13. The Commission is seeking royalty-free licensing of trademarks in the cereal in-
dustry case. See Kellog Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,898, at 21,915 (FTC, filed April
26, 1972).
14. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY (NEAL
REPORT), 115 CONG. REC. 1389 (1969); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
THE PATENT SYSTEM, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF THE USEFUL ARTS, S. Doc. No.
5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
15. See S. 1321, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (the Hart Bill); S. 2504, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973) (the Nixon Administration Bill); H.R. 11868, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) (The American Patent Law Association Bill). Hearings on the Hart Bill were
held by the Senate Judiciary Committee in September 1973.
16. The Chairman of Xerox's Board of Directors is reported to have said that he
"can't help but regard this as an onslaught on the whole basis of America's free-enterprise
system." FORTUNE, Jan. 1973, at 28. The role played by patents, among other things,
in bringing about the technological and market dominance in the general purpose digital
computer industry is also under attack in United States v. IBM, No. 69 Civ. 200
(S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969).
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Commission seeks two forms of compulsory licensing: reasonable royalty li-
censing for office copier patents obtained during a twenty year period follow-
ing the date of the Commission's final order and royalty-free licensing for
all of Xerox's existing office copier patents and pending applications.
A. Reasonable-Royalty Licensing
Although Congress' power to enact compulsory patent licensing legislation
has come under question at various times on fifth amendment grounds, 18 it
is now well established that a court has the power to apply this sanction
for violations of the 'antitrust laws' 9 as well as the power to withhold injunc-
tive relief against infringement where the granting of such relief will be ad-
verse to the public welfare. 20 Sanctions in the form of compulsory licensing,
though drastic, are not unknown for violations of the antitrust laws;21 indeed,
such relief is often the basis of antitrust consent decrees.
22
The power of the Commission to order reasonable-royalty compulsory
17. This relief also contemplates disclosure of the "know-how related to practice of
licensed patents." Xerox Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1 20,164,
at 22,152-53 (FTC, filed Jan. 31, 1973).
18. See Schechter, Would Compulsory Licensing of Patents Be Unconstitutional?, 22
VA. L. REV. 287 (1935); Wetzel, Can Patent Properties Be Redistributed Through Com-
sory Licensing?, I AM. PAT. L. ASS'N Q.J. 184 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 286, clarified, 324 U.S.
570 (1945); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
20. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1970), a district court has discretion to grant in-
junctive relief to a patent owner alleging infringement. Denial of injunctive relief is
the equivalent of granting a compulsory license to the infringer. See United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); Temco Elec. Motor Co. v. Apco Mfg. Co.,
275 U.S. 319 (1928); Landis Tool Co. v. Ingle, 286 F. 5 (3d Cir. 1923).
Under its eminent domain power the federal government has the right to use a patent
by or for the benefit of the government. See 28 U.S.C. § 1798 (1970); Hollister v.
Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59 (1885); James v. Campbell, 107 U.S. 356
(1880).
21. See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, clarified, 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
22. In the period from 1956 to 1967, compulsory licensing was the primary relief or-
dered. See A.B.A. CONSENT DECREE MANUAL (Supp. 1969-72). The decrees' definition
of "patents" often includes existing patents, patent applications and future patents. See
id. at 203, citing United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 1964 Trade Cas. 71,166,
at 79,630 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 1964 Trade Cas. %
71,144, at 79,509 (D.N.J.); United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 1956 Trade Cas.
68,544, at 72,208 (N.D. Ill.); United States v. American Linen Supply Co., 1956 Trade
Cas. 68,542, at 72,200 (N.D. Ill.); United States v. International Cigar Mach. Co.,
1956 Trade Cas. 68,426, at 71,827-28 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. General Shoe Corp.,
1956 Trade Cas. 68,271, at 71,229 (M.D. Tenn.); United States v. IBM, 1956 Trade
Cas. 68,245, at 71,122 (S.D.N.Y.). See also STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG.,
1974]
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licensing was established in American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC28 as a remedy
for violations of section 5. Where antitrust violations are found, and this
includes violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act which "may be con-
strued in pari materia with the Sherman and Clayton Acts,' 24 remedies aim
to cure the consequences of unlawful conduct and restore effective competi-
tion.25  When patents are involved in these violations, reasonable-royalty
compulsory licensing is appropriate even though the exclusive nature of the
patent grant is destroyed.
2 6
Although the twenty year reasonable-royalty period sought in Xerox for
all patents obtained during that time is unprecedented, an analogous sanction
was applied against the defendant in United States v. General Motors
Corp.,27 where General Motors was required to license any patents issued to
it during the five years following the entry of final judgment on a royalty-
free basis for the first five years following the date of issuance and at reason-
able royalties thereafter, in addition to being required to license already-exist-
ing patents on a royalty-free basis for the duration of their term.28
2D SESS., COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING UNDER ANTITRUST JUDGMENTS (Comm. Print
1960).
23. 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
24. Id. at 770.
25. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 255 (1955) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT].
26. See id. In a non-remedial sense, Congress has also seen fit to provide for limited
compulsory licensing in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (1970), with
respect to any patent declared to be "affected with the public interest" if it "is of primary
importance in the production or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy,"
and also in the National Air Quality Standards Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-6
(1970), with respect to any pollution-abating patent to which there are no reasonable
alternative approaches.
It has been suggested that any form of compulsory licensing encourages parasitic copy-
ing of patented inventions in a world where few patents dominate a market in a
manner which precludes competing products, patented or otherwise. See, e.g., Sease,
Common Sense, Nonsense and the Compulsory License, 55 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 233, 251
(1973). According to this argument, this will in turn encourage the utilization of trade
secrets, a result contrary to the goal of the patent system-to encourage the disclosure
and public use of ideas. See Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253,
1258 (6th Cir. 1972).
27. 1965 Trade Cas. 71,624, V at 81,807-09 (I) (E.D. Mich).
28. Id. at 81,807. Compulsory licensing can also take the form of dedication of
rights to the public, in which the patentee is permanently deprived of all rights in the
patent. Such relief can be employed where requiring small competitors to pay merely
reasonable royalties could serve to prevent them from competing in a market controlled
by the patent owner. See, e.g., United States v. Greyhound Corp., 1957 Trade Cas.
68,756, at 73,089 (S.D. Ill.); United States v. Magnaflux Corp., 1957 Trade Cas.
68,707, at 72,860 (N.D. 11.). However, this form of compulsory licensing is more dras-
tic than royalty-free licensing, where the patent owner retains title to the patent grant
and at some later time may be able to obtain a modification of the decree such as a
[Vol. 24:1
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There are, of course, inherent problems and administrative difficulties in
ordering reasonable-royalty compulsory licensing. 29 These problems include
the difficulty of determining what a reasonable royalty is for the particular
patent in the particular industry involved. Moreover, today's reasonable
royalty is not necessarily tomorrow's reasonable royalty and, therefore, the
parties may have to return for a modification of the decree. However, as
a body with administrative expertise, the Commission is probably in a better
position to oversee such a remedy than are the courts or the Department of
Justice.
30
Inasmuch as there is no affirmative duty on the part of anyone to seek
patent protection for an invention, the length of time during which Xerox
will be compelled to license all competitors at reasonable royalties if the FTC
is successful raises the problem that, where possible, Xerox will maintain pro-
prietary rights in its inventions by seeking to keep them as trade secrets. If
that occurs, neither the remedial purpose of the relief, nor the purpose of the
patent system to encourage public disclosure and use of inventions will be
realized.
B. Royalty-Free Licensing
The question of the Commission's power to order royalty-free compulsory
licensing in Xerox is not so easily answered, expecially since the Sixth Circuit
in American Cyanamid specifically refrained from holding that the Com-
mission could order compulsory licensing without -payment of reasonable
royalties. 31 As a practical matter, however, the Commission could establish
a royalty at so minimal a value as to amount to royalty-free compulsory li-
censing. From an administrative point of view, royalty-free licensing is cer-
tainly conducive to easier application by -the Commission, the Justice Depart-
ment and the courts since they are not then burdened with the determination
of "reasonable" royalties. Putting aside a possible constitutional prohibition
of royalty-free compulsory licensing, the Commission's power to order such
relief where absolutely necessary to remedy unfair methods of competition
would certainly be consonant with the wide discretion which it has exer-
reasonable royalty. The rationale behind the more severe dedication-of-rights approach
"appears to be that the interest against confiscation of private property is far outweighed
by the need to restore and maintain competition in an industry suffering from patent
misuse." 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 543, 548 (1964). See United States v. General Elec. Co.,
115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
29. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 255.
30. See Rushefsky, FTC Section 5 Powers and the Pfizer-Cyanamid Imbroglio:
Where Do We Go From Here, or 'You Ain't Seen Nothing Yet,' 18 CATH. U.L. REV.
335, 347 (1969).
31. 363 F.2d at 772.
1974]
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cised and which the Supreme Court has recognized is necessary in choosing
a remedy which bears a reasonable relationship to the practice sought to be
corrected.
82
However, this form of remedy has been looked upon as penal rather -than
remedial,33 and the Supreme Court has avoided its use where less drastic
measures such as reasonable royalty mandatory licensing will remedy anti-
trust violations.3 4 And while it may be true that royalty-free mandatory li-
censing is less severe than dedication of patent rights to the public, a review-
ing court may find that the Commission exceeded its sound discretion in or-
dering royalty-free licensing of all of Xerox's existing patents3 5 unless it can
be shown that even requiring Xerox's competitors to pay a reasonable royalty
would serve to keep them from competing in the market dominated by
Xerox. 86 Considering that Xerox's competitors include IBM, RCA and Bell
and Howell, and the magnitude of the confiscation of some 1,200 Xerox
patents if royalty-free licensing were ordered, the Commission may find it
a difficult burden to show a compelling need for 'this remedy.
At the same time, the wisdom of requiring even reasonable-royalty licens-
ing of all of Xerox's future office copier patents for a twenty year period is
also questionable, since this may actually put Xerox at a competitive dis-
advantage with a huge and well-financed competitor such as IBM. It could
also have a chilling effect on Xerox's research -and development efforts be-
cause -the company would be forced to shoulder the cost of probable research
and development failures while 'having to share its successes with competitors.
Moreover, relief on such a grand scale might also provide Xerox with the
incentive to adopt the trade secret route wherever possible and thus in the
long run work contrary to the goal of the patent system.
Whatever the ultimate relief granted in Xerox, and whatever may be de-
termined concerning the power of the Commission to order royalty-free com-
pulsory 'licensing even in an appropriate situation, the allegations of patent
32. See, e.g., FTC v. Brock & Co., 368 U.S. 360 (1961); FTC v. Mandell Bros., 359
U.S. 385 (1959); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); FTC v. Motion Pic-
ture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470
(1952).
33. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 256.
34. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 338, 349 (1947);
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 414, clarified, 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
35. As of December 31, 1972, Xerox owned approximately 1,200 unexpired patents,
most of which pertain to office copiers. See Complaint Counsel's Tentative Outline of
the Types of Facts to be Proven in Support of the Complaint, Xerox Corp., No. 8909
(F.T.C., filed Feb. 20, 1973). A partial summary of this outline is given in the order
denying Xerox's motion for more definite statement. Xerox Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 20,239, at 22,238-39 (FTC, Feb. 26, 1973).
36. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 844 (D.N.J. 1953).
[Vol. 24:1
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misuse raised in paragraph 14 of the complaint present far more fundamental
problems that currently affect the patent system and will remain unsolved
by the ad hoc nature of the relief ordered, no matter how stringent. To
be sure, Xerox could establish some severe anti-patent law and remedial ac-
tion*that could temporarily affect a number of enterprises chargeable with
similar misuses, which might have the effect of "giving religion" to those who
would seek to manipulate the patent system. But Xerox may yet be for the
patent bar an even greater blessing in the form of another critical opportunity
to observe the ways in which the patent system is malfunctioning and provide
some safe, quick and effective cures for bringing about its recovery. It is
to these particular problems that the remainder of this article is directed.
III. PATENT MONOPOLIZATION AS AN OUTGROWTH OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PATENT LAWS
A. The Patent System's Goal-Adding to the Sum of
Useful Knowledge
Establishing the raison d'8tre for the patent system is the necessary starting
point on the road to determining if and how the patent conduct alleged in
Xerox to transgress section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act frustrates
that purpose. The United States Constitution grants to the Congress the
power
[tio promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries .... 38
Although the constitutional clause is terse, its meaning, and the mode by
which the progress of the useful arts is to be promoted, have given rise to
much discussion over the years. 9 In fairly recent times, the Supreme Court,
in Graham v. John Deere Co.,40 found the clause to be "both a grant of
37. Excessive reliance should not be placed upon compulsory licensing decrees as the
cure-alls for antitrust violation. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COM-
PULSORY PATENT LICENSING UNDER ANTITRUST JUDGMENTS 52-53 (Comm. Print 1960).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
39. See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH
A STATUTORY STANDARD OF INVENTION (Comm. Print 1958); Kimball, An Analysis of
Recent Supreme Court Assertions Regarding a Constitutional Standard of Invention, 1
AM. PAT. L. ASS'N Q.J. 204 (1973); Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Require-
ment, 1 AM. PAT. L. ASS'N Q.J. 26 (1972).
40. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
19741
Catholic University Law Review
power and a limitation" which had been written in light of earlier experiences
in England where monopolies were granted in goods and businesses that had
been in possession of the public, a practice which was later curtailed. 4' The
standard expressed in -the Constitution requires that only things that add to
the "sum of useful knowledge" 42 are subject to exclusive rights but that not
necessarily all desirable work in the useful arts is patentable.43
B. The Patent System's Incentive
It requires no citation of economic authority to show that we live in a world
completely different from that inhabited by the drafters of the Constitution.
Our society is one in which technological capability seems to be exponentially
increasing.44 As this rapid change has taken place it has also been generally
acknowledged that the chief recipient of the patent system's benefits is no
longer the independent inventor but the large enterprise having sophisticated
and organized research and development departments. 45 A concomitant is
that corporations rather than independent inventors have taken the lead in
affording themselves the ownership of patent properties, 46 even though there
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id. at 6.
43. See Clark, The Patent System Deserves Clean Hands, I AM. PAT. L. ASS'N Q.J.
9 (1972).
44. See, e.g., A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1972). If the last 50,000 years of man's
existence are divided into lifetimes of about sixty-two years each, then there have been
800 such lifetimes. Of these, the first 650 lifetimes were spent in caves. Only during
the last seventy lifetimes has it been possible to do the communicating from one lifetime
to another which writing made possible. Only during the last six lifetimes did man see
the printed word. Only during the last four lifetimes has it been possible to measure
time with any precision, and only in the last two lifetimes has anyone anywhere used an
electric motor. The overwhelming majority of all material goods used today in daily
life have been developed in the 800th lifetime. Id. at 13-14.
There are other ways of showing the accelerated rate of technological growth. For
instance, the invention of the horse collar in the Middle Ages led to major changes in
agricultural methods and was as much a technological advance as the invention of the
Bessemer furnace centuries later. Id. at 25. 90% of all the scientists who ever lived
are alive today. Id. at 27. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, more than
60% has been cut from the average time needed for a major scientific discovery to be
transformed into a useful technological form. Id. at 28.
45. See President Richard M. Nixon, Message to the Congress Proposing Enactment
of the Patent Modernization and Reform Act of 1973, 9 PRES. Doc. 1198 (1973).
46. A somewhat dated study of patent ownership confirms this fact. See STAFF OF
THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., lST. SESS., DISTRIBUTION OF PATENTS ISSUED TO CORPORA-
TIONS, 1939-1955 (Comm. Print 1957). Of the total number of patents issued between
1939 and 1955, corporations accounted for over 58% and individuals 40%. Id. at 3.
During that seventeen-year period, 394 corporations had 100 patents or more issued to
each of them, and of these corporations, thirty-eight were issued over 1000 patents. Id.
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is some empirical evidence that the patent system still works to the advantage
of independent inventors.
4 7
The question concerning the developing role of the patent system becomes
whether the incentive provided by the first patent law, which was directed
at industrial inventors in small-scale enterprises, persists today in a techno-
economy comprised of large scale enterprises with organized research opera-
tions. If the incentive is not now the same, it is important at least to learn
how it is different 'and if it deserves the same ambit of protection that was
originally afforded to garret operations. This latter point is especially signifi-
cant in light of the antitrust laws which surround the patent law in a seem-
ingly ever-vigilant watch. One thing is clear from the changed circum-
stances. The existence of the patent system and the exclusive protection ex.-
tended by the patent laws 48 provide little or no incentive to creative activity
by the engineer or scientist employed by a large corporation as a member
of its research arm. For these people it is prestige, organizational status and
research budgets that spur inventive work.49  It thus becomes readily ap-
parent that if the patent system provides any incentive at all, the incentive
is provided to a class of persons other than inventors.
In the case of the individual inventor or small company, the patent system
obtains public disclosure of inventions by granting exclusive rights for limited
periods of time.50 To the small manufacturer ithis may be extremely helpful
in that he can increase sales of 'a product on the basis of patented improve-
ments rather than price, thereby overcoming the handicap of small volume
and high cost.51 Patent protection permits him to get back initial expenses
before competitors start copying the article.52 In discussing this dichotomy
of classes seeking the benefits of the patent system, a distinction must also
be made between the terms "invention" and "innovation." In simpler times
at 4. The 176 largest U.S. corporations held over 20% of the number of patents issued
during that period. Id. at 8. There is no reason to believe that the statistics have more
recently shifted to reflect greater individual ownership. See also O'MAHONEY, REVIEW
OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM, S. REP. No. 1464, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956).
47. See SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., INDEPENDENT INVENTORS AND THE
PATENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1961).
48. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970).
49. See McGuigan, A Technologist's View of Licensing Strategy, in THE LAW & BusI-
NESS OF PATENT & KNOW-How LICENSING E-3 (2d ed. 1972).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970) provides for a patent term of seventeen years during
which time the patentee, his heirs or assigns have the right to exclude others from mak-
ing, using or selling the invention throughout the United States.
51. See F. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
CONFLICTS IN AMERICAN PATENT HISTORY 26 (1956).
52. See id. at 30.
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invention and innovation might have been nearly synonymous; but, as tech-
nology has grown more complex and products more sophisticated, a gap has
developed between invention, in the form of conceiving an idea and showing
it is workable, 5a and innovation, as the task of bringing the invention into the
marketplace. 54 In today's world, it is the innovative step that makes measur-
able and significant contributions to increases in 'the gross national product
(GNP) and it is the companies committed to innovative effort that have
grown at a rate far in excess of that of the GNP.5
In asserting that the goal of the patent system is to provide incentives to
"invest, disclose, develop and invest risk capital" on research and develop-
ment,56 the patent bar goes far 'beyond any incentive to invent or to disclose
the invention to the public in return for exclusive rights. Such a broad-based
incentive seeks also to include -the entrepeneurs and others with risk capital
to invest and the myriad of other corporate personnel in a well-developed
organization who painstakingly produce a commercial product from a crude
conception. When considered in this scope, the incentive provided by the
patent system to these classes of personnel appears illusory and the need for
technological innovation appears to be more realistically stimulated by the
fear of product obsolescence in rapidly changing markets. 57
Yet patent lawyers continue to assume-as if there were absolutely no
evidence to the contrary-that the patent system exists not merely to encour-
age inventive effort and make the results available to the public 'but also to
encourage speculative investment in the first instance and continued invest-
ment in inventive effort in an established business that modern research and
53. As used in the patent law, the term "invention" means the conception of an idea
and an actual or constructive reduction to practice, even though this reduction to practice
does not necessarily result in a commercial product. See, e.g., Cody v. Aktiebolaget,
452 F.2d 1274, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 990 (1972). Even when
used in this sense, "invention" and "innovation" are not synonymous.
54. See PANEL ON INVENTION AND INNOVATION OF THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: ITS ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT 2 (1967) [herein-
after cited as PANEL ON INVENTION REPORT].
55. See id. at 3-5. During the period from 1945 to 1965, the average annual growth
of the GNP was 2.5%. In the same period, Polaroid Corporation had an average an-
nual net sales growth of 13.4%, IBM had a growth of 17.5% and Xerox Corporation
had a growth of 22.5%. Industries involved with "displacement innovations," i.e., those
which displace existing products or processes, do not have the dramatic results attained
by a company such as Xerox. See id.
56. 16 AM. PAT. L. ASS'N BULL. 744 (1973) (statement of C. Marshall Dann, Presi-
dent of the American Patent Law Association).
57. See A. TOFFLER, supra note 44, at 67. In the pharmaceutical and electronic
fields, for example, the rate of product turnover is often as short as six months. Id.
at 71-72.
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development and product success supposedly demands.58 Although there is
little, if any, economic support of either this or the contrary view,59 a com-
mon-sense approach to the matter dictates that decisions relating to the crea-
tion of inventions or the introduction of new or improved product lines are
too speculative and risky to be affected significantly by future events such
as the likelihood of success in obtaining meaningful patent protection or the
abili.ty to utilize a patent in an effective manner against competitors.60 Com-
petition has traditionally involved rivalry among manufacturers of like prod-
ucts as well as the stimulating effect of innovators who introduce new prod-
ucts and reduce costs through new production and distribution methods. As
-these activities accelerate, the influence of innovation on competition be-
comes more pronounced6' and cannot be ignored as a major competitive fac-
tor in itself.62 While bringing new products, processes and services to market
is thought to be a keystone to economic growth,63 research and development
is but a small portion of the cost in successful innovation.6
4
58. See Whale, Antitrust Encroachment on Patent Imperatives, 47 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
125, 128 (1970). That patent grant is assumed to bring an "entirely new dimension"
to competition because of the "necessity for competitors to discover their own routes to
successful products." Id.
While this assumption might have validity where one or a few patents dominate a
market or a product, it is erroneous in a situation where monopolistic or oligopolistic
enterprises have built up a patent portfolio covering not only the basic invention but
also different approaches toward the same objective. In such case, the patent laws, via
threats of infringement actions, actually deter potential competitors from gaining access
to the market.
59. See Massell, The Patent System and Economic Development, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV.
486, 487 (1971).
60. See Adelman & Jaress, Patent-Antitrust Law: A New Theory, 17 WAYNE L. REV.
1, 13 (1971). Yet the businessman is told that it "seems reasonable to assume" some
connection between the effectiveness of patent protection and the level of investment in
research and development. Hummerstone, How the Patent System Mousetraps Inven-
tors, FORTUNE, May 1973, at 264. See also Stedman, Patents and the Antitrust Laws
in ANTITRUST ADVISER § 7.1, at 348-49 (C. Hills ed. 1971).
61. Innovation increasingly crosses industry lines. For instance, electrostatic copying
came from outside the conventional office equipment system. See PANEL ON INVENTION
REPORT 7.
62. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950). No
product is so unique that it creates an absolutely inelastic demand. There are always
products sufficiently interchangeable so that if the price of something becomes too high,
the purchasing segment of the public can avoid purchasing it by substituting alternative
products. Id. at 84.
63. See PANEL ON INVENTION REPORT 8.
64. See id. at 9. An approximate cost distribution pattern in successful product inno-
vation is thought to be as follows:
Research-Advanced Development
Basic Invention 5-10%
Engineering and Product Design 10-20%
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Thus, there must be a growing awareness of the fact that not only does
the patent system provide incentives to create new products, processes and
services but also to a number of other factors completely unrelated to the
exclusive rights granted by the patent laws.65 Moreover, future innovation
can in large part be expected to be generated by federal and local govern-
ment in seeking solutions to a variety of environmental and energy prob-
lems.6 0
C. The Role of the Rule of Reason
The above discussion demonstrates in a summary way that it is nearly im-
possible to attempt to separate fact from fiction concerning the patent sys-
tem's incentives. The patent bar accepts as an article of faith that the patent
system provides incentive to large corporations and small inventors alike and
in modern times as it did in the agrarian economy of the constitutional au-
thors. However, at least some doubt must be entertained concerning the im-
portance of this incentive.
Notwithstanding this doubt, a judicious approach to the patent system
under the "rule of reason" 67 for adjudging behavior not specifically exempted
Tooling and M anufacturing Cost ----....-.-.-.- .............................. 40-60%
Manufacturing Start-Up Expenses -.------------------.........----------------- 5-15%
Marketing Start-Up Expenses -................----------- ------.-- -- - 10-25%
It has also been suggested that to obtain a rough idea of the research and development
costs to the total cost of innovative activites-both successful and unsuccessful-total
company expenditures on research and development in the manufacturing sector be com-
pared with the total net sales of these companies. In 1964, for example, total sales
amounted to $293 billion whereas company-financed research and development expendi-
tures totalled $5.7 billion, resulting in a still smaller ratio of 2%. id. at 9-10.
65. See id. at 13-14. These factors would include, among other things, individual and
institutional venture capital sources that have a receptive attitude toward financing new,
small science-based firms; technical universities in proximity to a business climate that
encourages these universities to generate technical ventures; a business atmosphere con-
ducive to entrepreneurial activity; and close and frequent consultation among technical
people, entrepreneurs, universities, venture capital sources and others essential to the in-
novative process.
66. See F. VAUGHAN, supra note 51. Whatever the main source of future invention
and innovation, history appears to show little correlation between the grants of exclusive
rights and the emergence of great inventions. See id. at 11-12.
More immediate incentive to innovate can be provided in the form of favorable tax
provisions without the possibility of creating barriers to potential competition. Tax in-
centives can be most advantageously used by small companies. One proposal is to allow
a longer period during which losses can be carried forward to offset profits. See PANEL
ON INVENTION REPORT 34-41.
67. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 1 (1911). As a general
rule of construction, the rule of reason in antitrust cases requires an interpretation of
the antitrust laws in light of the broad public policy favoring competition and condemn-
ing monopoly. The courts thus have the discretion to refuse to outlaw conduct unless
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by ithe patent laws provides the necessary reconciliation between those who
believe that the patent system was intended simply as an inducement to in-
ventors to disclose their inventions to the public in exchange for exclusive
rights for limited periods of time68 and the widely held view that the patent
system provides incentive to research, development, and innovation. Ad-
herents of the latter view believe this incentive function is accomplished in
the following manner:
1. Providing an incentive to invent by offering the possibility of
reward to the inventor and those who support him, thereby en-
couraging the expenditure of time and private risk capital in
research and development efforts;
2. Stimulating the investment of additional capital needed for fur-
ther development and marketing of the invention;
3. Encouraging early public disclosure of technological informa-
tion, some of which might otherwise be kept secret; and
4. Promoting the beneficial exchange of products, services, and
,technological data across national boundaries by providing pro-
tection for the industrial property of foreign nationals.69
Regardless of the number of incentives -the patent system today provides,
or their relative importance in inducing invention and innovation, the rule
of reason gives ample latitude for the patentee to enjoy the fruits of the ex-
clusive rights conferred by the patent grant. Thus, for those rights not specif-
ically exempted from the operation of the antitrust laws by the patent laws,
the rule of reason will look to the circumstances to determine whether the
patentee is receiving a reward reasonable within the limits of the patent
grant. 70 Aside from per se violations,71 such a rule provides the independent
inventor or garret operator with a greater ability to utilize the patent laws
to promote competition than it does established companies such as Xerox.
D. Patent Monopolization and the Patent Office
Paragraph 14 of the Commission's complaint charges Xerox with monopo-
lizing and attempting to monopolize patents applicable to office copiers. Ap-
it is significantly or unreasonably anti-competitive in character or effect. See ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S REPORT 11.
68. See Bryan, Proposals for Modifying the Administrative Procedure of the Patent
Office to Improve Patent Validity, 1 AM. PAT. L. ASS'N Q.J. 194 (1973).
69. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, supra
note 14, at 2-3.
70. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926).
71. Per se violations are those forms of conduct which by virtue of their pernicious
nature or effect are conclusively presumed to be illegal without regard to their reason-
ableness. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 11.
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parently, the Commission's theory is that a number of component misuses
comprise the aggregate charge of monopolization and attempting to monopo-
lize office copier patents.72 Several of these component charges are of partic-
ular interest because they derive directly from the current operation of the
patent laws as administered by the Patent Office. Paragraph 14 includes
a charge of creating a patent structure of improvement patents equivalent
in scope to expired basic patents and a charge of creating -a high risk of in-
fringement of Xerox's existing patents.73  In essence, the Commission is at-
tacking the large number of patents that Xerox has obtained over the years
to protect its commercial office copier as well as its alternative technology.
1. An Overburdened Patent Office.-Despite the large size of the United
States Patent Office, 74 it is ill-equipped to determine with any certainty that
the patents it issues are for inventions that are new, 75 useful,76 and unobvi-
ous. 77 A major reason for the Patent Office's inability to fulfill this mission
can be attributed to the magnitude of patent applications filed 'annually.
Even if an acceptable starting assumption were -that the goal of the patent
system is realized by granting patents on inventions which represent less than
basic discoveries, it is difficult to believe that 100,000 patentable inventions
are forthcoming each year through domestic and foreign research and devel-
opment, even in today's technologically-oriented society. Yet, in fiscal 1972,
72. See Denial of Motion for More Definite Statement, Xerox Corp., [1970-1973
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. f 20,239, at 22,238-39 (FTC, filed Feb. 26, 1973).
73. Another, but less important charge insofar as this thesis is concerned is the fail-
ure by Xerox to cite pertinent prior art to the Patent Office during the prosecution of
the applications and the filing of defective oaths caused by its failure to refer in Contin-
uation-in-Part applications to applications filed more than twelve months before. See
Complaint Counsel's Tentative Outline of the Types of Facts to be Proven in Support of
the Complaint, Xerox Corp., No. 8909 (F.T.C., filed Feb. 20, 1973).
A Continuation-in-Part application is a patent application filed during the lifetime of
an earlier application by the same applicant, repeating some substantial portion or all
of the earlier disclosure and adding subject matter not disclosed in the earlier case. See
PAT. OFFICE MANUAL OF EXAM. P. § 201.88, at 10 (rev. ed. 1974). 35 U.S.C. § 102(d)
(1970) includes as prior art against Continuation-in-Part applications those inventions
that were first patented in a foreign country prior to the date of filing of the Contin-
uation-in-Part application or an application filed more than twelve months before the
filing of the Continuation-in-Part application in the United States. While this allegation
is not an insignificant problem, it is often a matter of oversight on the part of the appli-
cants and their attorneys. Furthermore, it does not point up a fundamental deficiency
in the operation of the patent laws.
74. In fiscal 1972 the Patent Office employed 2,836 personnel, including 1,276 pro-
fessionals, and had a budget of $61.339 million. 1972 COMM'R OF PATENTS ANN. REP.
31-32.
75. See 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1970).
76. See id.
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
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the number of patent applications filed reached 102,663,78 an increase of
almost fifty percent over the 1953 total.
Add to this the fact that during recent years corporations with far greater
resources than individuals have been the chief participants in the patent sys-
tem, and the seeds of patent accumulation have been planted. Not only
does the mass of patent applications present practical problems relating to
backlogs of pending applications79 and adequate examination of each appli-
cation, but it -permits corporations to build a portfolio of patents for "defen-
sive" purposes, thereby creating a 'high concentration of patents in one owner.
No particular problem is discerned by the act of an individual inventor or
even a small company accumulating patents resulting from the fruits of the
inventor's genius or -the small company's internal research and development
program.80 If anything, ,this would be the prime incentive of :the patent sys-
tem and the necessary shield to protect the rights of the inventor and the
fledgling operations of a small company that might not yet be price competi-
tive with other enterprises in -the same market. Nor is the accumulation of
patents through acquisition by the individual, small company or even a domi-
nant company such as Xerox necessarily a violation of the antitrust laws.s '
Thus, the fact that Xerox purchases patented office copier technology from
Battelle Memorial Institute and Battelle Development Corporation does not,
in and of itself, violate the antitrust laws. However, a company with a mar-
ket position like Xerox's will have its -acquisition conduct scrutinized far more
closely for the presence of other factors such as the nature and scope of the
acquired patents, the effect of the 'acquisition on the purchaser's position in
the industry, the extent of the patent rights acquired and whether the patent
purchases were from a competitor or noncompetitor82 The presence of these
factors along with the patent purchases would most probably constitute an
antitrust violation.
Thus, though -the accumulation of patents in any amount by a person or
78. See 1972 COMM'R OF PATENTS ANN. REP. 12.
79. See id. at 2, 11.
80. See R. NoRHAnus, PATENT-ANTrrRuST LAw § 15, at 31-32 (2d ed. 1972).
81. The acquisition of patented technology generated by another will not be discussed
in great detail, although it forms part of the Commission's monopolization charge con-
tained in paragraph 14. This activity can be attacked under the antitrust laws pursuant
to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. H9 1, 2 (1970), or section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). See Note, Patent Acquisitions, Section 7, and
Public Policy, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 166 (1972). Although the legislative history of section
7 of the Clayton Act does not mention patent acquisition, the term "assets" in that sec-
tion has been interpreted to mean anything of value. See United States v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
82. See Stedman,.supra note 60, § 7.4, at 352.
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corporation has not been attacked as fundamentally improper,83 a careful dis-
tinction must be made between those patents acquired by internal research
and development and those purchased from another . 4  Though the former
invite only the charge of monopoly rather than monopolization,8 5 the latter
involve a purchaser who might achieve a monopoly position through a delib-
erate program of patent acquisition from the labors of others.86 Courts in the
past have had no hesitancy in finding violations of the antitrust laws when
such acquisitions are coupled with other anticompetitive activities.
87
2. Higher Fees to Discourage Patent Accumulation.-Great numbers of
patents certainly increase the risk of infringement of one or more of the
patents in the portfolio by a competitor. Recently, the Supreme Court has
noted the high cost of patent infringement litigation to private parties. 88
Especially for the small businessman, the cost of carrying on such litigation
is unthinkable89 and thus raises a barrier to entry into markets such as that
for office copiers. As a first step in reducing the number of accumulated
patents held by corporations, 'a "negative incentive" must 'be provided for re-
ducing the number of patent applications filed in the Patent Office.
The most simple and direct method for ending this deluge of applications
would be the imposition of substantially higher filing fees to deter all but the
most serious inventors from treading the road to the Patent Office and to
give even large corporations some pause in undertaking mass filing programs
on minor improvements and alternative technology.90 Of course, the filing
83. See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 834
(1950).
84. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 312, 333, 339-
40 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
85. See Stedman, Acquisition of Patents and Know-How by Grant, Fraud, Purchase
and Grantback, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 199, 200 (1967).
86. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 106 F. Supp. 561 (D. Del.
1952); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332
U.S.: 319 (1947).
87. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) (price
fixing); Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, clarified, 324 U.S. 570
(1945) (production and area of sale limitations); United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp.
184 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957) (restrictions on grants of li-
censes).
88. The average cost of litigating a patent is believed to be about $50,000. See Blon-
der-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 335 (1971).
89. See id. at 334, citing Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 641 (2d Cir.
1942) (concurring opinion of Frank, J.).
90. At present, the patent law provides for a $65 fee upon the filing of each applica-
tion for an original patent, a $10 fee for each claim in independent form in excess of
one, and a $2 fee for each claim (whether independent or dependent) in excess of ten.
See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1970). This, of course, is in addition to attorneys' fees incurred
in the preparation of the application.
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fees cannot be set so high that only a very few well-financed corporations
could monopolize the benefits of the patent system to the exclusion of individ-
uals and smaller companies who are willing to disclose significant inven-
tions. But on the other hand, the loss of some worthwhile inventions by
under-financed individuals or companies may have to be accepted as the
price to be paid in adjusting the patent system.
The Patent Reform Act of 1973 (the Hart Bill), 91 which is currently pend-
ing in Congress, proposes that the fees in connection with the filing of appli-
cations "shall be designed to effect an overall recovery on the range of 65 to
75 per centum of the cost of operation of the Patent Office."'92 This has been
criticized by the patent bar as being unduly expensive and burdensome to
applicants. 93  In concentrating on the individual applicant, this type of
criticism overlooks the large number of patent applications being filed in
light of the present fee structure. While the problem with this bill, as in
the case of the other two pending patent revision bills,94 is overambition in
attempting to revamp the patent laws, several areas are worthy of change
and the area of filing fees is one of these.
3. A Lower Standard of Patentability.-The problems created by the
large number of patent applications filed annually do not end with patent
accumulation. Other consequences include poorer quality of examination
and a lower standard of patentability when the Patent Office is faced with
minor improvement inventions and inadequate prior art. The lower standard
of patentability is evidenced by the large number of patents issued annually
as compared to the number of applications filed.9 5 Though the primary re-
sponsibility for sifting out unpatentable inventions resides in the Patent
Office, 96 the success rate for litigated patents is unfavorable97 and renders
the statutory presumption of the validity of patents issued by the Patent Of-
fice almost hollow.98
Moreover, it is not prudent to expect that the patent examination system
will or can be improved upon the initiative of the Patent Office since, in the
91. S. 1321, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
92. Id. § 41(b)(1).
93. See 16 AM. PAT. L. Ass'N BULL. 762 (1973) (statement of C. Marshall Dann,
President of the American Patent Law Association).
94. S. 2504, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (the Administration Bill); H.R. 11868,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (the American Patent Law Association Bill).
95. In the United States about 70% of patent applications are eventually granted,
while in Germany and Japan less than one-third of all applications result in patents. See
Hummerstone, supra note 60, at 270.
96. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
97. From 1966 to 1971 federal courts of appeals invalidated 69% of the patents liti-
gated before them. See Hummerstone, supra note 60, at 262-63.
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970).
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first place, it has no control over the input of applications. The administra-
tors in the Patent Office are "systems oriented" in that they seek greater ef-
ficiency of operation and are more concerned with managerial objectives."'
Since both the individual inventor and large-scale enterprise will benefit from
the grant of fewer but stronger patents, the patent community, especially the
patent bar, bears 'a heavy responsibility in resuscitating -the elderly patent sys-
tem in a manner that will make issued patents more credible to the courts
before which they are litigated. 00
E. Raising the Standard of Patentability and Abolishing
the Terminal Disclaimer
As part of Xerox's alleged patent accumulation activities, the Commission
charged that a large number of patents have been generated containing trivial
and overlapping claims, resulting in a web of patents so broad in scope and
number that an entrant into the plain paper office copier market runs a high
risk of an infringement suit. There seems no better starting solution to the
elimination of this problem than a limitation upon the number of applications
for patents, as well as a marked increase in the quality of examination of
these applications.
A second step in dismantling patent structures like that alleged in Xerox
99. In March 1972, the Commissioner of Patents circulated a memorandum to all
Patent Office employees congratulating them on the dramatic improvements in the op-
eration of the mail room, application branch and assignment branch. As to the most
important function-examination-the Commissioner merely stated that substantial prog-
ress had been made toward the goal of an average pendency of eighteen months and
established a counsel to conduct a study of patent examining activities and to develop
recommendations. 15 AM. PAT. L. Ass'W BULL. 214-18 (1972).
100. One suggestion for upgrading the quality of issued patents is to devise a method
which will bring the best prior art to the attention of the Patent Office. Adversary pro-
ceedings are frequently mentioned as the best method to accomplish this result. See
Bryan, supra note 68, at 196-97. The various bills pending in Congress, see note 15
supra, also recognize that some form of opposition proceeding is necessary to ferret out
pertinent prior art that is often known only to those directly involved in the particular
industry. Thus, H.R. 11868 provides for re-examination after issue on the bases of pub-
lications and patents (§ 191) and public use, prior inventorship and deprivation (§ 192).
S. 2504 provides for publication of pending applications that have been allowed (§ 132
(e)(3)), and opposition proceedings thereafter (§ 135). S. 1321 also provides for op-
position proceedings (§ 135), but before the application is allowed (§ 122).
The necessity for some form of opposition proceeding is reinforced by the opinion of
judges who have had patent cases litigated before them and who seem to agree that a
major problem faced by the patent system is that the best prior art is often not known
by or cited to the Patent Office. See Clark, supra note 43, at 10-11; Davis, Patent
Trial Advocacy: Some Views From the Side of the Bench, I AM. PAT. L. Ass'N Q.J. 65,
72 (1972); Will, The Patent System: One Man's View, 1 AM. PAT. L. Ass'N Q.J. 49,
50 (1972).
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would be the imposition of maintenance fees during the life of the patent.
The efficacy of such fees is recognized even 'by the patent 'bar.'01 Business-
men make decisions based in large part on cost and profitability. The old
saw that "money talks" has validity in such matters as budgets for patent
departments. Small businesses or individuals especially will only continue to
pay maintenance fees on those patented inventions that pay for themselves.
Given a fairly high fee during the latter term of a patent, even a dominant
company such as Xerox would have a difficult business decision to make in
maintaining a portfolio of patents having little or no commercial significance
and, at the same time, subjecting them to antitrust risks. Once both the
number of patent applications filed and patents in force decrease, assuming
that significantly higher filing fees and maintenance fees proposed above are
instituted, it is reasonable 'to expect the Patent Office to raise standards by
which patents are granted, especially if opposition proceedings become a
reality. 10 2 With this can come the ability to refuse patents directed to minor
improvements or trivial differences in claimed subject matter.
The problem of overlapping claims between different patent applications
can only be solved by legislation, since the law generated by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals permits an extension of exclusive rights in
scope, if not in time, by allowing applicants to overcome double patenting
objections with the filing of a terminal disclaimer.' 0 3 Miller v. Eagle Manu-
facturing Co. 04 held that an inventor is precluded from obtaining two patents
for the same invention. Interpreting what is the "same invention" is ob-
viously difficult. The liberal approach of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, by no means the prevailing view, 0 5 distinguishes between two types
101. The Legislative Committee of the Rochester (New York) Patent Law Associa-
tion has proposed low maintenance fees for the first eight to ten years of the patent
and then steeply escalating fees to encourage the abandonment of all but the most com-
mercially important patents. See 16 AM. PAT. L. ASS'N BULL. 253 (1973).
102. See note 100 supra.
103. See, e.g., In re Robeson, 331 F.2d 610 (C.C.P.A. 1964). Terminal dis-
claimer practice, statutorily sanctioned by 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1970), is the method by
which double patenting objections are obviated. By the patent applicant's agreeing to
permit the second patent to expire simultaneously with the first patent, the public's right
to make full use of the original patented discovery at the end of the original seventeen
year period will not be impaired and an unwarranted extension of the patent monopoly
will be precluded. See In re Bowers, 359 F.2d 886 (C.C.P.A. 1966). Both patentees
and their assignees may make use of terminal disclaimers. See id.
104. 151 U.S. 186 (1894).
105. Thus far, courts have not looked favorably upon patentees in cases involving an
assertion of double patenting. See, e.g., C-Thru Prods., Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 262 F.
Supp. 213 (E.D.N.Y.), a! 'd, 397 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1968); Hays v. Reynolds, 242 F.
Supp. 206, 145 U.S.P.Q. 665 (D.D.C. 1965), at 'd, 148 U.S.P.Q. 365 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Sterling Varnish Co. v. Louis Allis Co., 145 F. Supp. 810, 113 U.S.P.Q. 26 (E.D. Wis.
1957).
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of double patenting: where the claims of the reference patent or 'application
and the rejected claims are drawn to the same invention, and where the refer-
ence claims and rejected claims are directed to obvious variations of the
single invention.106 In the latter case, the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals would permit the filing of 'a terminal disclaimer to overcome a double
patenting rejection because it does not view the expansion of the scope of
exclusive rights as a substantial evil.107
While the terminal disclaimer analysis of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals may fit nicely into the theoretical model of the patent system which
that court has constructed in reviewing actions of the Patent Office, there
seems to be a wide gap 'between the model and the ability of well-financed
corporations to expand their exclusive rights in scope by filing patent applica-
tions directed to obvious variations on the same theme and thwart the Patent
Office by filing terminal disclaimers. These same corporations can extend
their exclusive rights in time, too, for under the present system the Patent
Office's preoccupation in dealing with the sheer number of patent applica-
tions, coupled with the failure to bring the best prior art to the Office's atten-
tion, results in a lower standard of patentability. As a result, minor improve-
ment patents can presently be obtained without ever filing a terminal dis-
claimer.
Again, minor legislative changes would greatly improve the situation.
Only three basic statutory sections would be needed, and these are present
in one form or another in pending legislation. To assist the Patent Office in
raising the standard of patentability, Congress should enact into law a provi-
sion that the patent applicant shall have the burden of establishing that the
claim is patentable. 06 The elimination of terminal disclaimer practice by
applicants would then be greatly discouraged by providing that the term of
the patent shall expire twenty years from the date of filing in the United
States, or, if the benefit of the filing date of another application is claimed,
from the earliest date.' 0 9 This would all but put an end to the argument
that, absent terminal disclaimer practice, the public would be left with the
undesirable alternative of delayed disclosure due to the filing of Continua-
tion-in-Part applications containing the fruits of subsequent research. 10
106. See In re Faust, 378 F.2d 966 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438
(C.C.P.A. 1970).
107. See, e.g., In re Bowers, 359 F.2d 866 (C.C.P.A. 1966); In re Robeson, 331 F.2d
610 (C.C.P.A. 1964). See also Doherty, Double Patenting and Section 121-Multiply
or Divide?, 54 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 583 (1972).
108. See S. 2504, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 137 (1973).
109. See id. § 154(b).
110. See De Jonghe, Double Patenting and Terminal Disclaimers, 54 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 627, 630 (1972).
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Even more desirable would be enactment of a provision that a terminal dis-
claimer has no effect in the determination of the patentability or validity of
the claims in patents which either have been or may be issued so as to expire
at the same time by virtue of the terminal disclaimer."' These rather simple
statutory changes could have far-reaching consequences in restoring some vi-
tality to the Patent Office.
IV. PATENT MONOPOLIZATION
A. A Glance at Some Other Allegedly Illegal Activities of Xerox
The other patent misuse allegations in the FTC's complaint relate to the
use of issued patents with respect to competitors and potential competitors.
As such, these activities are beyond the pale of the Patent Office's adminis-
tration of the patent laws and, except for licensing activity specifically pro-
vided for by statute, 1 2 are governed by the rule of reason. Some of the ac-
tivities under attack by the Commission include failing to commercially ex-
ploit patented technology, obtaining exclusive licenses for related technology,
purchasing patented technology, inserting grant-back provisions in licenses,
entering into cross-licensing arrangements and refusing to grant licenses." 83
Field of use limitations are also being attacked by the Commission as a sep-
arate violation of section 5.114 None of the allegations when considered on
its own in the past has been found to constitute an antitrust violation. When,
however, some or 'all of these activities are combined, the rule of reason may
lead a court to find Sherman Act violations or affirm a finding by the Com-
mission of a section 5 violation.
1. Field-of-Use.-The Commission's allegation that Xerox's imposition
of field-of-use limitations on low speed copiers as a separate section 5 viola-
tion forms a convenient crystallization point for the remaining discussion.
Quite aside from the Commission's new look at this type of limitation, the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has time and again singled out
the field-of-use as a patent licensing abuse." 5
111. See S. 1321, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(c) (1973).
112. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970) provides that "[t]he applicant, patentee, or his assigns
or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under
his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United
States."
113. See Complaint Counsel's Tentative Outline of the Types of Facts to be Proven
in Support of the Complaint, Xerox Corp., No. 8909 (F.T.C. Feb. 20, 1973).
114. See id.
115. Address by Donald Baker, Director of Policy Planning, Department of
Justice, Before the Banking Law Journal's Fifth Annual Institute on Licensing Law
and Practice, May 24, 1973.
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The field-of-use limitation is simply one in which the patent owner licenses
the manufacture, use or sale of the patented invention only with regard to
a particular field. 116 This would include limiting a licensee to the manu-
facture or sale of low speed copiers. The landmark case of General Talk-
ing Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.117 upheld such restrictions even
-though they, along with territorial restrictions, are without statutory sanc-
tion. One reason advanced in behalf of such restrictions is that since the
licensees are not competitors of the patent holder there is little substance -to
'the charge of anticompetitive effect."" Such a rationale would not be eco-
nomically justifiable, however, where a licensor carves up his field-of-use to
create artificial boundaries. Certainly manufacturers of plain paper copiers
are competitors of manufacturers of coated paper copiers. Likewise, manu-
facturers of high speed copiers are competitors of manufacturers of low speed
copiers. For this reason alone, there appears to be no justification for -the
field-of-use provisions imposed by Xerox.
Even under the best of circumstances, exclusive field-of-use provisions,
where the licensor agrees to stay out of the licensee's field and to grant no
additional licenses in the licensee's field, may in effect be viewed as a divi-
sion of markets."19 Moreover, the Justice Department has taken the position
that General Talking Pictures is built upon a shaky precedent, 120 which it-
self is "ripe for overruling.''2 The Justice Department's position is that at
the very least a field-of-use limitation should be struck down unless there
is proof of absolute economic necessity. An example of absolute economic
necessity would be where the reservation of a field to the patent owner is
deemed necessary to induce him to enter into a license when he himself oper-
ates in a particular field and will not license at all unless given some market
protection.' 22 While an individual or small business might make a convinc-
ing showing in this regard, it is difficult to see how a company with a domi-
nant market position could show economic necessity, absolute or otherwise.
There are, however, some possible advantages in employing field-of-use
limitations in license agreements. Licensees can obtain a lower royalty rate
in a field in which the patent owner is not competing. The licensee may
116. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 236.
117. 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
118. See Keating, The Patent Monopoly Versus Antitrust Activism: Open Warfare
or Armed Truce?, 77 DiCK. L. REV. 1, 17 (1972).
119. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
120. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
121. Address by Roland W. Donnem, Director of Policy Planning, Department of
Justice, Before the Michigan State Bar Convention, Sept. 25, 1969.
122. Id.
[Vol. 24:1
FTC v. Xerox Litigation
not otherwise want to commit himself in speculative fields in which he has
little interest or is unable to make a satisfactory evaluation. Field-of-use
limitations also provide flexibility in permitting varying royalty rates where
a licensee is practicing under more than one field, and, where the license re-
quires minimum royalties, the possibility of providing -the licensee with the
option of cancelling the license in an unsuccessful field. None of these ad-
vantages appear applicable, however, to the office copier market which in-
volves no speculation at this time. The coated paper office copier or low
speed office copier fields, as artificially created fields -that do not maximize
the patented invention's potential, are not alternatives that the public de-
sires. 123 In such a situation the contention that a field-of-use restriction is
"nothing more than permission to make, use or sell in a defined segment of
technology"' 124 would be fatuous.
Nonetheless, the Commission should proceed carefully in attacking 'the
mere presence of a field-of-use provision as a violation of section 5. There
are advantages in its use in certain circumstances and its effect is not so
pernicious that a violation of the antitrust laws occurs automatically without
a further inquiry into its reasonableness. Should the Commission ultimately
find this to 'be a per se section 5 violation, a reviewing court would be wise
to scrutinize its reasoning carefully.
2. Grant-Backs.-Definitionally speaking, a grant-back is a provision
which requires -that a licensee, as a condition to receiving a patent license,
grant back to the patent owner rights of varying scope in inventions that the
licensee may make. Such a provision by itself was upheld in Transparent-
Wrap Machine Co. v. Stokes & Smith Co. 12 6 In attacking this type of restric-
tion in concert with the other alleged practices of Xerox, the Commission
does not appear to be pointing in a new direction since grant-back provisions
have previously been found illegal when coupled with other restrictive prac-
tices.1
26
Grant-back provisions have traditionally been of several types: non-
exclusive rights in the licensee's inventions; a license under the licensee's in-
vention which can be either non-assignable or granted with a right to sub-
license; an assignment of the licensee's rights in its invention; a limitation on
"granted-back" inventions to only improvement patents; and a limitation on
grant-backs to new inventions in defined fields. 'Jhe only grant-back pro-
vision at which the Justice Department is apparently not aiming its ire is the
123. See Whale, supra note 58.
124. Id. at 140.
125. 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
126. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.NJ. 1953).
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non-exclusive type on improvements with reasonable royal-ties being paid to
the improvement licensor.127 As to the others, however, many contend that
-they unduly expand the patent monopoly and stifle research and develop-
ment efforts on the part of licensees. Thus, the ability to predict trouble




B. Incorporating the Rule of Reason into the Patent Act
As is the case with most other patent licensing practices, the patent bar
accepts as holy scripture that the legalization of exclusive rights manifested
in the letters patent ordains that the antitrust law must give a wide path to
the manner in which these exclusive rights are used in the market place.1
2 9
By now experience should have debunked this belief. While single and iso-
lated practices such as grant-backs, cross-licensing, patent pools and field-of-
use limitations may not .be particularly objectionable in certain circumstances,
in other circumstances, or when such practices are combined, a severe crip-
pling of competition can occur.
The patent laws and antitrust laws have 'basically the same ends-promot-
ing the progress of the useful arts through competition.130 Xerox may
have fallen into the common pitfall of a company which has successfully
pioneered a new product, in this case the office copier, acquired a strong mar-
ket position with respect to the product, and then made the mistake of en-
deavoring to foreclose competitors through a variety of otherwise seemingly
unobjectionable practices."'1 It is here that the patentee must look to a rule
of reason rather than using the patent grant as a club to swing in a wide
circle to keep away would-be competitors. A patent holder in Xerox's posi-
tion has a range of terms which 'he may include in varying forms in license
agreements. The test should be one of over-all reasonableness,"32 since in
one context most licensing practices 'may be perfectly reasonable while in an-
other context clearly unreasonable."'3
As long as there is a set of patent laws to contend with on one hand, and
127. Donnem, supra note 121.
128. Austern, Umbras and Penumbras: The Patent Grant and Antitrust Policy, 33
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1015, 1018 (1965).
129. See id. at 1025-26.
130. Address by Robert Bicks, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before
the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law of the American Bar Association
in 41 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 791 (1959).
131. See Siegel, Patent M-onopoly and Sherman Act Monopolization, 49 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 67, 75 (1967).
132. See Address by Richard McLaren, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, July 14, 1971.
133. See id.
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a set of antitrust laws on the other hand, there will be a continuum of dif-
ferent approaches toward the licensable nature of patents. 34  This in turn
leads to the confusion'3 5 that caused the President's Commission on the
Patent System to recommend that the rule of reason constitute the guideline
for determing patent misuse.136 Faced constantly with this type of provision
in the patent laws, patent lawyers will necessarily have to develop a cautious
approach when formulating license agreements or advising corporate clients
on a course of action concerning a patent portfolio. As the client becomes
bigger and more dominant, that advice will have to become more conserva-
tive in avoiding breach of the antitrust laws. This is as it should be.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the proposed consent order, some might forsee the Commission's
action in attacking Xerox's patent practices as an ominous portent of things
to come. A more enlightened view, however, would be that this scrutiny of
the patent system will be, in the long run, beneficial to patentees, licensees,
,the patent bar and the public interest generally. For it is clear that the pre-
sent state of the patent system pleases no one. Moreover, the mere fact that
the Commission felt it necessary to file the Xerox complaint indicates that
the current administration of the patent laws and the utilization of letters pat-
ent are out of phase with the underlying concepts of the patent system. In
short, the patent system is overdue for reform.
The legislation currently pending in Congress make a worthwhile attempt
to correct the patent system's faults. Unfortunately, they appear to be far
too ambitious to expect passage in the near future and, indeed, have been
stalled in Congress for over a year. In light of this regrettable situation, per-
haps a more limited attempt at reform would be more successful. Much
good would be accomplished if the number of applications filed annually
could be reduced. Attainment of this goal would require only a significant
increase in fees for patent filings. Placing the burden of establishing patent-
ability on the applicant would reduce the number of issued patents and in-
134. The Honorable Simon H. Rifkind, co-chairman of the 1966 President's Commis-
sion on the Patent System, was quoted as saying: "The antitrust laws are invariably given
an expansive reading, as expansive as the language will tolerate. The words of the pat-
ent statute, in contrast, to my reading, seem to be extruded through a pinhole gauge."
Hummerstone, supra note 60, at 268.
135. The REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, supra
note 14, at 36-38 pointed out that "uncertainty exists as to the precise nature of the pat-
ent rights and there is no clear definition of the patent misuse rule. This has produced
. . a reluctance by the patent owners and others to enter into contracts or other ar-
rangements pertaining to patents or related licenses."
136. See id., Recommendation XXII, at 36.
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crease the quality of letters patent, especially if adversary proceedings be-
come a reality. Elimination of the almost invisible line between the scope of
two patented inventions by abolishing the present terminal disclaimer practice
will go far in preventing undue extensions of exclusive patent rights.
On a more practical plane, patent lawyers called upon to advise clients
on the licensable nature of patents can best 'be served by specifically provid-
ing in the patent laws that "reasonableness" is the applicable guideline. No
specific exemption or magic formulas will be superior to the task of judging
the appropriateness of licensing provisions in light of the specific facts of each
case. Reforms such as these, though not as far-reaching as might be desired,
would certainly improve the operation of the patent system, a goal beneficial
to all involved.
